Certifiers of quality often report only coarse grades to the public despite having measured quality more finely, e.g., "Pass" or "Certified" instead of "73 out of 100". Why? We show that coarse grades result in more information being provided to the public because the coarseness encourages those of middling quality to apply for certification. Dropping exact grading in favor of the best coarse grading scheme reduces public uncertainty because the extra participation outweighs the coarser reporting. In some circumstances, the coarsest meaningful grading scheme, pass-fail grading, is the most informative. JEL: D82, L15.
Introduction
Grades are often coarse. Rather than an exact number or rank, a grade is usually only a rough indication of quality, such as a letter grade or even just a binary pass-fail grade. Safety organizations usually certify that a product is safe with a seal of approval that does not indicate whether the product passed tests just barely or by a wide margin. Environmental organizations typically certify environmental quality with a simple "eco-label" rather than revealing the results of their more detailed evaluation. When it comes to reporting the results to the public, they throw away information.
Why this waste of information? An obvious reason is that it costs more to grade finely than coarsely. But this can't be the entire explanation, since the certifier often collects detailed information but refrains from reporting it. 1 When the certifier deliberately reclassifies information with a coarsening filter before reporting the results publicly, coarse grading is more expensive than exact grading, not cheaper.
This coarsening of information is a puzzle since a certifier has an incentive to provide accurate information so as to increase the value of its services to consumers and advertisers.
Making coarsening even more of a puzzle, many certifiers are non-profits with the explicit goal of providing consumers with the best information. For instance, non-profits run most of the numerous eco-label schemes that provide information on products' environmental, health, and social impacts. Of 363 different schemes tracked by Ecolabelindex.com, 209 are controlled by non-profits, 59 by industry groups, 53 by governments, and 42 by for-profits. 2 If the certifier really wants to provide accurate information to consumers, why make the information coarser than necessary? We suggest that the answer often lies in certification being voluntary. In situations such as certification for eco-labels, costly cooperation from the firm is required, and the certifier needs to get the firm to participate. Just as a student would be reluctant to attend a medical school that would publicly rank him as the worst student in his class to earn an M.D., a firm would not be eager to be stamped with a seal of approval that tells the world it barely passed. Hence, a certifier who wants to maximize information needs to consider how the grading scheme affects the willingness of firms to be certified at all.
Coarsening induces participation. If the certification grade is coarse, a mediocre type is pooled with better types, so its expected quality conditional on the certification grade is 1 For instance the EnergyStar label requires that a third-party measure energy usage and certify that it is below a threshold, but the label does not indicate the actual energy usage. Similarly, 95% of a products ingredients must be organic for a product to use the label "organic", but the label does not usually indicate the exact percentage. 2 We thank Anastasia O'Rourke for providing this information, which is for 2009.
higher than its true quality. Therefore it has more incentive to bear the costs of certification, and participation rises. We show that at the margin the extra information from increased participation outweighs the loss from throwing away information on those that do participate.
Hence, in the scheme that maximizes information, the certifier always throws away information.
Moreover, under plausible conditions the optimal scheme is maximally coarse: the firm or person being tested simply passes or fails and the exact test scores are never shown to the public.
We show that the optimal scheme is either pass-fail or what we call an "honors" scheme in which senders who are just "good enough" to pass remain pooled, while senders at the top are differentiated exactly. Schools do not publicly provide class rank information about most of their graduates, but do publicly honor the valedictorian and other top students. Safety and environmental organizations provide product labels that certify a passing grade, and sometimes also provide public awards that highlight the best achievers. Recommendation letters work the same way: some students (or employees) won't even ask for a letter, some receive favorable boilerplate letters, and the best receive individuated letters with fine distinctions in commendation.
Since coarseness is used to encourage participation, the model predicts that coarseness is less likely when quality evaluation does not require the cooperation of the sender. Camera companies cannot prevent consumer reviewers at Amazon.com or professional reviewers at CNET from rating their products. Thus, without the need to encourage participation by firms, we should expect product review websites to provide fine information. Indeed, most such websites provide summary measures containing exact numeric scores, fine categorizations, or some combination thereof, and offer immediate access to detailed review information. 3 We also expect that coarseness is less likely for mandatory labels provided by government agencies. Since they can force firms to provide information about their products, there is no need to encourage participation by clouding the truth. Using the data from Ecolabelindex.com, we found that of the 174 voluntary labels from OECD countries for which grading data could be found, only 5 of them provide exact grades or grades with more than a few levels. In contrast, all 5 of such mandatory labels provide fine or exact grades. 4 As shown in Figure 1 , the US 3 Amazon, Yelp, and TripAdvisor report overall quality using star or half-star intervals, and also report exact numeric rankings. CNET provides numeric ratings. The consumer reviews that the ratings and rankings are based on are all linked to. In contrast, certifiers such as Underwriters Laboratory that provide pass/fail labels to participating firms typically treat the exact test results as confidential. 4 We do not analyze these differences formally. As indicated by a referee, there is an important endogeneity issue in that governments might be more likely to adopt mandatory schemes when the quality variable of interest is more easily measured. Department of Energy's voluntary "Energy Star" label for home products only indicates that the product has met a certain standard for low energy usage, while the FTC's "EnergyGuide"
label that is mandatory for large appliances provides exact information on energy usage and expected energy cost.
Our results help fill a significant gap in the literature. Lizzeri (1999) and others show how a certifier trying to maximize his own profits from charging for certification can do so by reporting product information coarsely. Ostrovsky & Schwarz (2010), Gentzkow & Kamenica (2011) and others show how a certifier seeking to maximize perceived sender quality (and hence the payoffs of senders) can often do so by reporting information coarsely. Considering the three different parties involved in certification -certifiers, senders, and receivers -the existing literature assumes that the certifier acts to maximize his own benefit or the benefit to senders, while we assume that the certifier acts to maximize the information benefit to receivers. Our assumption would seem particularly unlikely to lead to coarse grading, but we find the same general result that the certifier injects some coarseness into his grading. In the last section of this article we will say more about these and other papers.
The Model
A sender (the "firm") has quality  distributed on [0 1] according to distribution  with bounded differentiable density  where   0 on (0 1). 5 The realization of  is the firm's private information. The certifier first commits to a grading scheme, a mapping of measured quality  to message . If the firm applies for certification, the certifier measures its quality perfectly and reports message  based on the grading scheme. If the firm chooses not to apply for certification, the certifier reports the message  = "uncertified". An application costs the firm a fixed amount   0 in time and trouble.
A consumer (the "receiver ") updates his estimate of quality  [|] based on the prior distribution  and the equilibrium meaning of . The firm maximizes [|] − () by the choice of whether or not to apply to be certified. Taking  as given, the certifier chooses a grading scheme to best inform the consumer, in the sense of minimizing the expectation of a continuous, convex loss function
) with a global minimum where actual quality equals the consumer's estimate of firm quality at  (0) = 0. 6 In our numerical examples we use the quadratic loss function
2 that is standard in the senderreceiver literature. Our formal results are more general. 7 Our equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, so given any grading scheme, consumer beliefs must be consistent with firm choices and follow Bayes Rule and firm choices must be best responses to consumer beliefs. If  is so large that there exists no equilibrium in which any positive measure of firm types would apply for certification under a grading scheme, we call that scheme infeasible. We ignore equilibria where the consumer does not expect a firm to certify its quality and punishes unexpected certification with unfavorable off-equilibriumpath beliefs.
We allow for any grading scheme, but there are three schemes of particular interest. 8 In Figure 2 (a)'s exact grading scheme the product's quality is exactly revealed, with message  = . Under exact grading, there will exist a quality level  such that all types  ≥  have sufficient incentive to be certified, as we will explain below, but types below  =  will not be certified. Since types  ≥  are exactly revealed, the expected loss under exact grading consists of the loss from misestimating quality of the uncertified firms in the quality interval 6 It does not matter whether there is just one certifier or many. Since the goal of a certifier is to maximize information to consumers, it will not engage in competition that worsens information, e.g., by providing exact grading to firms with very high quality to draw them away from (and destabilize) a pass-fail certifier. 7 Quadratic loss functions for the receiver are standard in the strategic information transmission literature following Crawford & Sobel (1982) . In this case, minimizing the quadratic loss function is equivalent to maximizing the receiver's payoff. Assumptions behaviorally equivalent to this are also widely used as the default case in signaling (e.g, Spence, 1973), persuasion (e.g., Milgrom, 1981), and certification games (e.g., Lizzeri, 1999). 8 However, in all of the schemes we assume the certifier is restricted to setting the same certification cost  for all firm types. As suggested by a referee, charging lower quality firms less than higher quality firms can improve information while maintaining budget-balance. 
If a scheme is not exact then it is coarse: the exact quality of at least some product types is not revealed. One or the other of two coarse grading schemes will turn out to be optimal, depending on the circumstances. Figure 2 (b)'s pass-fail grading is the coarsest grading scheme:
the message is  ="uncertified" if  ≤  and  ="pass" if   . 9 Assuming that  is set so all types    have sufficient incentive to be certified, the expected loss of pass-fail grading is
The other optimal coarse grading scheme is Figure 2 (c)'s honors grading, which sets a standard  above which quality is revealed exactly but also divides types below  into two groups by a passing standard . If  ≤  then  = "uncertified", if      then  ="pass", and if  ≥  then  = . Assuming that  and  are set so that all types    have sufficient incentive to be certified, the expected loss of honors grading is
For a scheme to be called "honors" we require    to distinguish it from exact grading and   1 to distinguish it from pass-fail grading. In each of these grading schemes the certifier reports "uncertified" for a firm that fails to meet the certification standard, so such firms are pooled with firms who do not apply. 
Why Coarseness Helps
In this section we will use the quadratic loss (or mean squared error) function
2 and examples based on specific quality densities  to make three simple points.
First, Figure 3 (a)'s uniform density will show how coarse grading can be better than exact grading by increasing participation. Second, Figure 3 (b)'s falling triangle density will show how pass-fail grading can surpass not only exact grading but honors grading too. Finally, Figure 3 (c)'s rising triangle density will show how coarse grading can be feasible when exact grading is not. These "can happen" results build intuition. Section III will generalize the results to broad classes of distributions and general convex loss functions.
Coarse Grading Can Increase Information by Increasing Participation
First, suppose that the quality density  is uniform, as in Figure 3 
in the feasible range. As seen from Figure 4 (a)'s "P-F" line, pass-fail grading provides more information to consumers than exact grading when  is large enough that few types will be certified under exact grading. Although pass-fail grading provides only noisy information, more middling types are willing to be certified since they can pool with high types, and the extra information on these types more than compensates for the extra noise.
Pass-fail grading does better than exact grading for high , but honors grading does even better. Honors grading cuts region [0 ) in two using the passing standard . Suppose we leave  = 2 as before and set  = , so the lower region is divided evenly. Types in the exact region  ≥  now have more incentive to be certified, rather than look like a bad type who can't even pass. Types in the new pass region gain
from passing so at  = 2 this gain just covers the certification cost. Therefore all types This result that coarse grading -either pass/fail or honors -is better than exact grading will be shown to hold generally later in Proposition 1.
Pass-Fail Grading Can Be Most Informative
To see how pass-fail grading can outperform honors grading, consider Figure 3 (b)'s falling triangle density  = 2 − 2, which has the property that the gain from passing, [| ∈
Consider pass-fail grading, so  = 1, and first suppose that the certification cost  is low. When  is low,  can be set to divide the region [0 1] to minimize expected loss without the participation constraint being binding. In particular, from minimization of (2), the best division is at  = 
] there is slack in the pass-fail participation constraint for those types that apply; the types near  = 1 can be exactly revealed and  ≈ 382 is still optimal and feasible. Thus, as with the uniform density, the certifier can do even better by using honors grading. This is seen in Figure 4 (b), where for low , honors grading reduces expected loss relative to pass-fail grading.
As  rises the participation constraint becomes binding. The gain from passing is increasing in the cutoff , so  will have to be set higher to ensure participation. If  falls from  = 1 to  0  1, to have honors grading the gain from passing must fall, so  will have to be set even higher to ensure participation, to some value  0  . Honors grading is no longer "for free" If  is such that the uncertified group is already sufficiently large, the information loss from additional noise about the group dominates and the expected loss rises. Figure 4 (b) shows this. For  ' 412, the optimal honors grading scheme has  arbitrarily close to 1, which is equivalent to pass-fail grading.
This result that pass-fail grading can be most informative will be generalized and extended in Proposition 2.
Coarse Grading Can Be Feasible When Exact Grading Is Not
So far we have concentrated on how coarse grades can increase participation by more types and thereby increase informativeness. We now focus on feasibility. When can a scheme induce any participation at all? For the uniform density the schemes induce different amounts of participation, but all of them can induce at least some participation for   12, as in Figure   4 (a). Similarly, for the falling triangle density each scheme is feasible if   23, as in Figure   4 (b).
As an example of how coarse grading can be feasible when exact grading is not, consider This result on the greater feasibility of coarse grading will be generalized and extended in Proposition 3.
Propositions for General Distributions of Quality
The above analysis compared the informativeness and feasibility of the exact, pass-fail, and honors grading schemes for particular distributions and the quadratic loss function. We now generalize our analysis to include any grading scheme, any quality density  that has full support, and any symmetric, convex loss function.
Properties of means on being above or beneath a cutoff are central to our analysis. Section II's examples implicitly showed this, and we will see it generally in this section. We are (iv) For unimodal  , ∆ is strictly quasiconvex.
(v) For unimodal  , the minimum of ∆ is internal iff  () and  () are sufficiently small.
As the cutoff  rises, some types who are below average in the upper region are shifted into the lower region where they are above average, so as stated in Property (i) the means of both the lower and upper regions rise. 10 Property (ii) says that if the quality density is log-concave, it does not increase in slope too rapidly at any point so the upper and lower means do not rise too rapidly. This property is useful for understanding exact grading. In particular, it tells us that if there is a cutoff  such that all types above that cutoff are exactly revealed ( = ), then raising  increases the mean of the uncertified region at a rate slower than 1. As a result, the gap  − [| ≤ ] between the marginal type who is graded exactly and the average quality of the uncertified pool is increasing in . This gap is the maximum amount that the marginal type is willing to pay to be certified, so when  is logconcave the cutoff for the most informative feasible exact grading scheme increases with certification costs. Most standard densities and all of our specific examples are logconcave (see Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005) , so finding the most informative exact grading scheme is straightforward.
Properties (iii-v) say how the gap ∆ between the upper and lower means changes with . 11 For  =  this gap is the most a type in the pass region is willing to pay to be separated from the uncertified pool. Monotonicity property (iii) says that for monotonic densities the gap ∆ is monotonic in the opposite direction. A decreasing density puts relatively more mass at the lower end of each region, so a rise in  has more impact on the upper mean and the gap rises. Similarly, for an increasing density a rise in  has more impact on the lower mean so the gap falls. Monotonicity implies that the maximum gap is at either end of the support, so for a sufficiently high cost of certification the pass standard will be set either very high as in Figure 3 (b), or very low as in Figure 3 (c). Quasiconvexity property (iv) implies that for unimodal densities (which include all logconcave densities and all monotonic densities), the gap ∆ is decreasing and then increasing in  on either side of a unique minimum (which need not be internal), so again the maximum is at either end of the support. The internal minimum property (v) says that the unique minimum of ∆ implied by (iv) is internal if and only if the mode of  is internal and the "hump" is sufficiently large relative to the density on either side. 12 Note generally that
, so when ∆ is maximized at either end of the support the maximum is at whichever end is further from [].
For our first proposition we will generalize our finding that coarse grading outperforms exact grading for the uniform distribution. Recall that for the uniform distribution, turning exact into honors grading by introducing a "pass" region is always possible. We start with the exact scheme  * and introduce honors grading by setting  =  0 slightly below  * . Will types in ( 0   * ) still participate? Yes, for uniform  , because the gain from passing relative
is constant in  for a given  * . For the rising triangle distribution and more generally for any rising  as shown in Property (iii),
is decreasing in  so again it is always possible to introduce a pass region with  0   * that does not affect the proportion of types who are exactly graded.
More generally, if the decrease to  0   * reduces the pass region's mean more than the fail region's mean then the participation constraint is no longer met for  =  * . Hence,  will have 11 The gap between upper and lower means has broad implications for signaling games with binary signals (e.g., Benabou & Tirole 2006 . 12 Hence (iii) can be shown as an implication of (iv) and (v), though we show it directly in the Appendix. The following Proposition says that despite the possibility of loss from putting some formerly revealed firms into a pool it is always possible to find a coarse scheme that outperforms the best exact grading scheme. The idea is that for marginal decreases in  0 below  * there is a first-order effect on types in [0  0 ], but only a second-order effect on types in ( 0   0 ) because the pass interval is so small. The result holds for Figure 5 (a)'s example, and more generally.
Moreover, of all possible grading schemes -not just the three we have highlighted -the best is either pass-fail or honors.
Proposition 1 (Optimality of coarse grading) For any quality density  , the most informative feasible grading scheme is either pass-fail (   = 1) or honors (    1).
PROOF: See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 says that either pass-fail or honors grading is superior to exact grading or more complicated schemes. It does not say when pass-fail grading is superior to honors grading. 14 To better understand why pass-fail grading is better for high certification costs, look at Figure 5 (b). This is the same case as Figure 5 (a) except that the pass region has been expanded so much that the honors region is squeezed to nothing. If we start with Figure 5 (a)'s honors scheme ( 0   0 ) and increase the pass region by dropping  0 to  00 , we must also increase  0 to maintain feasibility. Since costs are high and we started towards the upper end of the density, as we increase the pass region enough, the honors region shrinks to zero and we arrive at a pure pass-fail scheme with  00 = 1. Types in the interval [0  00 ] contribute less to total expected loss since the pool is tightened so each type is closer to the conditional mean. Types in ( 00   0 ) also contribute less since the types in this region have been moved from a larger to a smaller 14 Recall that we require  is strictly less than one for "honors grading" so pass-fail grading is not merely a subset of honors.
pool. Types in ( 0   0 ) contribute more information loss, however, because the pool these types are in has expanded, as do types in region [ 0  1] because they were formerly exactly revealed.
Overall we have gained information on types in [0  0 ] and lost information on types in ( 0  1].
Numerically, this adds up to a net improvement in information for the case in the figure, so  = 1 in the optimal scheme and pass-fail grading is best. 
Extension: Letter Grading with Different Consumer Priors on Different Firms
So far we have followed the literature's standard assumption of a single firm drawn from a distribution or, equivalently, multiple firms from the same distribution. Now suppose the certifier must use the same grading scheme for multiple firms when it is common knowledge that firms have different quality distributions. For instance, consumers might know that one firm is likely to be better than another in environmental quality-they have firm-specific prior information-but only the firms know their exact quality. We are particularly interested in when multi-tier certification in the form of "letter grades"
is optimal. The "LEED" certification system for building environmental impact has "Certified," "Silver", "Gold", and "Platinum" categories. For a firm with a good reputation, receiving just a "Silver" rating might not be worth the certification cost, but for a firm with a bad reputation such a rating might well be worth it. Hence, having different tiers might increase participation when consumers have different prior distributions about different firms. for sufficiently high costs is, from Proposition 2, pass-fail for each distribution of firm. Let this optimal pass-fail cutoff be   for the lower-range distribution and   for the higher-range distribution. We could reframe these two pass-fail schemes as a system with four grades, "Uncertified" and "C" for the lower distribution and "B" and "A" for the higher distribution.
In this example, A and C grades would be awarded, but no B's would be observed since types would not want to pay  to be certified as being in the bottom region of their distribution. Figure 6 , 15 keeping the same relative values for the cutoffs   −   and   −   that were optimal when there was no overlap. Suppose the certifier assigns "Uncertified" for  ≤   , "B" for  ∈ [     ), and "A" for  ≥   . The firms which apply cannot do better by being uncertified, because the cutoffs were chosen in the original example to make this unprofitable and nothing has changed in the firms' incentives. The high-distribution firms in (     ] that do not apply would receive B's if they unexpectedly applied, but the cost  is too high for that to benefit them, since for any beliefs, the expected payoff is strictly less than for receiving an A and   has been set so that types in the A region are just indifferent to certification.
Now suppose the two densities overlap moderately with
Hence, given the grading scheme, it is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for high-distribution firms in (     ] to apply and get A's, low-distribution firms in (     ] to apply and get B's, and the remaining firms to not apply. Is the grading scheme still optimal for the certifier?
For sufficiently high ,   is arbitrarily close to   , so      as in Figure 6 and there is effectively no interaction between grading for the different distributions. Hence the scheme that is individually best for each distribution remains the best for the combined case.
This shows that when consumers have independent information about firm quality that makes the prior distributions for each firm differ, the combination of that information with certifier grading can lead to more complicated grading schemes being optimal, including those with multiple grades. 16 Based on this example we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Letter grades)
If the same grading scheme must be used for firms with different quality distributions, then sometimes the most informative scheme uses multiple coarse letter grades and does not report any quality exactly.
Literature Discussion and Conclusion
We have shown that a certifier who is trying to maximize information to the public should, paradoxically, coarsen his information before reporting it. Rather than simply revealing what he has measured, the certifier will reveal only part of what he knows, and in some situations will only reveal whether a firm passes a quality threshold. The certifier faces a tradeoff between coarse grading, which attracts more firms to be certified, and fine grading, which informs the public better about the firms attracted. We show that the optimal tradeoff always involves some coarseness.
Two strands of the literature are most closely related to the situation we model. The first looks at the alternative setting in which a for-profit certification intermediary designs a scheme to maximize rent extraction from firms afraid of consumer beliefs about their quality if they 16 Other models can also generate multi-tier certification. lack certification. Lizzeri (1999) shows that the profit-maximizing scheme is pass-fail with all but the very worst type of firm receiving a passing grade. By certifying almost everyone, the certifier can extract a certification fee from almost everyone. Since each firm is afraid of being pooled with the minute number of bottom-quality firms who remain uncertified, the fee can be large. Our model differs in assuming that the certifier aims to maximize consumer information, as in the case of a non-profit certifier who charges just enough to cover the costs of certification or who charges nothing but requires firms to bear some cost in providing information. The certifier introduces coarseness not to gain profits but to induce participation by firms who want to be distinguished from worse firms but do not want to be distinguished from even better firms.
A second strand of the literature concerns certifiers whose goal is to maximize the benefit to the subjects being certified. That literature introduces strategic reasons to obscure the information the public receives. Indeed, the ideal would be to perfectly fool the public. Ostrovsky & Schwarz (2010) consider colleges which choose grading schemes to maximize the success of their students on the job market. Depending on the distributions of jobs and student abilities, students overall may gain if weaker students are pooled together with better students. The average quality of students at Yale might be so high that they will all get jobs if their grades are so uniformly high as to be uninformative, but weaker students might not get jobs if they are revealed as weak. In their model, students are exogenously assigned to colleges, so colleges are free to ignore the selection effect we study in the present paper. Chakraborty & Harbaugh itself (the firm in our model) committing to a disclosure policy, rather than a certification intermediary doing so, and find that a coarse disclosure policy often benefits the sender. Our model differs from these because the certifier's objective is to inform the public rather than mislead it and because firms can choose not to be certified. Coarseness in these models reduces information to the public without any gains from encouraging participation.
Other important reasons for coarse grading have also been analyzed in the literature but we have abstracted from them in our model. We assume that coarse and fine grading are equally Our approach adds to this rich literature by showing how coarseness is optimal in the environment that would seem least conducive to it -when the certifier is explicitly trying to maximize information to the public and the testing process produces a continuous score that the certifier could choose to report. Related to our approach, Rosar & Schulte (2012) address the design of tests to minimize weighted mean squared error when the quality of risk-averse agents is high or low. They find that for moderate levels of agent risk aversion, a pass-fail test with no false positives is optimal because it induces agents to volunteer for the test even at the risk of ending up with a worse public image.
Our results depend on there being costs of certification so coarseness can play an important role in encouraging participation. Studies find that certification costs can be a substantial fraction of total costs (Vitalis, 2002) , 18 and that the process of applying for certification can be lengthy and compete for limited managerial resources. 19 Given these costs, the decision of whether to certify product quality is highly dependent on the effect on buyer willingness to pay. Our analysis shows how the coarseness of the grading scheme affects buyer estimates of product quality and thereby affects the incentive of marginal firms to participate.
An alternative explanation for coarse grading is that consumers have difficulty processing exact information. This explanation is at odds with the detailed information available on consumer evaluation websites as discussed in the Introduction. Nevertheless, there have been proposals for government agencies to make mandatory labels less exact so as to help consumers.
For instance, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed the Federal Trade Commission to consider switching the mandatory EnergyGuide label to a coarse star-ranking scheme for this reason.
However, after reviewing the evidence on how consumers use labels and performing its own 17 They assume a continuum of certifiers who each put some different, varying weight on a mix of firm profits and consumer surplus, thus leading to a continuum of different standards that firms can pick from. Since firms choose the hardest standard they can meet, exact information is revealed. 18 The main association of small and medium businesses in the European Union listed its primary requested revision in eco-label policy as, "An overall reduction of the costs, in particular the costs of the technical tests required in order to show the respect of the criteria." (See "UEAPME's Position on the Revision of the Eco-label
Regulation," UEAPME, November, 2008), p. 4. 19 The 2010 Global Ecolabel Monitor found that the average time between filing the application for an ecolabel and being awarded the label was 4.3 months.
tests, the FTC determined that consumers learned most from exact information about expected energy costs (Farrell, Pappalardo & Shelanski 2010) . 20 From the perspective of our model, this is consistent with the use of coarse labels by non-governmental organizations being driven not by consumer difficulty in understanding exact labels but by the need to encourage firm participation. For mandatory schemes where participation incentives are not a factor, shifting away from exact grades would hurt rather than help consumers.
Appendix
Upper and Lower Means Properties For any differentiable density  () with full support on interval [ ] and any  in that interval:
(iii) For strictly decreasing (increasing)  , ∆ is strictly increasing (decreasing).
(iv) For unimodal  , ∆ is strictly quasiconvex.
(v) For unimodal  , the minimum of ∆ is internal iff  () and  () are sufficiently small. 20 The EPA made a similar analysis of how to represent information about greenhouse gases and smog damage in the new version of its mandatory gas mileage labels, and chose to use a fine 1-10 scale. It also chose to continue reporting exact mileage and gasoline cost information rather than coarsen the information. See http://epa.gov/otaq/carlabel/labelcomparison.htm. so  0 (0) = 12. If  (0) = 0 then applying l'Hopital's rule again  times until  () (0) 6 = 0 yields
Proof: Integrating by parts, for
and generally  0 (1) ≥ 12. Since    for   0 and    for   1, equation (5) and these limits together prove property (i).
Regarding property (ii) from (5),  0  1 if and only if  · R  0  ()   2 , which is implied by the logconcavity of R  0  () as seen from the second derivative of ln(
. Logconcavity is inherited by integration, so logconcavity of  implies logconcavity of  and hence of R  0  (), so this proves the second part of the property and the first part can be shown similarly.
Regarding property (iii), differentiating (5) and substituting,
First consider  decreasing. From (6),  0 (0) = 12, and from (7),  0  0 implies  00  0 evaluated at any  such that  0 = 12, so  0 cannot cross above 12 for any . Similarly, To show property (iv) for unimodal  we need to show that ∆ 0 =  0 −  0 crosses zero at most once and from below, which is equivalent to  0 crosses  0 at most once and from below.
Hence it is sufficient to rule out  0 ever crossing  0 from above. From (7) note that  00   00
for  0 =  0  12 and  00   00 for  0 =  0  12. Hence for  0 to cross  0 from above for some  ∈ (0 1), it must be that at the crossing  0 =  0  12. Let  0 be the mode of  . As shown above,  0 (0) ≥ 12 and from (7)
And as shown above,  0 (1) ≥ 12 and from (7)
which by the same constraints must be at  =  0 . To have the crossing be from above and not violate these constraints it must be that  00 and  00 both equal 0 at  =  0 and locally are positive around  =  0 . But this requires that  0 () is locally positive around  =  0 (i.e., that  00 ( 0 )  0 if the second derivative exists), which is inconsistent with an internal mode.
Regarding property (v), we know from property (iv) that ∆ 0 crosses zero at most once and from below, so for sufficiency we will show that ∆ 0 does cross zero once for some  ∈ (0 1)
for  (0) and  (1) sufficiently small. By the intermediate value theorem, a sufficient condition
Recall that  0 (0) ≥ 12 and  0 (1) ≥ 12, and note
. Hence the condition is that both
necessity, we will show that for either  (0) or  (1) too large to meet this condition,  0 cannot
for unimodal  fall below 12 and rise back to  0 (1) ≥ 12, so if  0 =  0 for some  it must be that  0 =  0  12, implying by (7) that  0 crosses  0 from below, which is inconsistent Proof: (1) We first show that the most informative grading scheme is either pass-fail, honors, or exact grading. Consider an alternative feasible scheme with  0 as the lowest type to be certified and  00 as the lowest type to be exactly revealed. For this scheme to be different from one of the three schemes, it must be that: 
which is the same as if all types in  and  pool, so there is no gain in informativeness from not pooling. If either set does not have positive measure, then there is no effect on expected loss from the scheme, unless all the zero-measure non-pooling sets together have positive measure.
If they do, then integrating over these sets, the same argument applies that expected loss can be reduced by pooling if the means differ and is unaffected if the means are the same. then the separate analysis of each case still holds. Suppose instead that there is a pooling set
stays the same as  changes. If  ≤  then feasibility is not binding so expected loss can be lowered by increasing the exact grading region. Considering the case of   , total differentiation of  gives
so the derivative of the expected loss for the region  with respect to  as  adjusts to keep the mean constant is, using (9) to go from lines 2 to 3,
where the final inequality holds by the convexity of . Therefore increasing the cutoff  for the start of the top region, while raising the cutoff  for the end of the bottom region to keep the mean the same so as to preserve feasibility, always lowers expected loss for   . If the pooling set is not composed of intervals then the same argument applies if there is positive measure in each region. If not there is no expected loss from such pooling unless there is an infinite number of such sets that together have positive measure. In that case these sets can first be pooled together by the same arguments as in (i), and then the above argument can be applied to the pooled set.
(2) Given that the most informative scheme is one of the three schemes, our next task is to show that the best scheme is either pass-fail or honors.
Consider the best feasible exact scheme  * where all types  ≥  * apply for certification, i.e.,  * is the lowest  such that  − [|  ] = . This scheme is the most informative exact scheme. First consider an honors scheme ( ) where  =  * . Define the function () as the lowest  feasible for  and the given :
Note that () ≤  for feasible  since if  is feasible then at least the one-type pool [ ] is feasible. If ( * )   * then the honors scheme (( * )  * ) is more informative than the exact scheme  * and honors grading is superior to exact grading (though pass-fail might be even better; see Proposition 2).
So suppose instead that ( * ) =  * , which means that a feasible honors scheme requires
is continuous in  and  (recalling that  is differentiable), the function () is continuous in the neighborhood below ( * ) =  * . Since
is strictly increasing in , the derivative of () is negative:
   0. Therefore, starting at  =  * so that ( * ) =  * , we raise  above  * and () falls. If an honors scheme is feasible for types in the pass region it must be feasible for higher types in the exact region, so such a change is feasible. We are interested in whether the expected loss,
is decreasing in , thereby implying that      . The derivative of (12) with
The third and fifth terms of (13) are zero when () =  * = , the particular case we are looking at, while the fourth term equals zero because
The first term is negative because    0, while the second term is zero for the particular case of a quadratic loss function that is often assumed, but more generally equals
where the first line is from integration by parts, the third line from the loss increasing from zero at  (0), and the fourth line from convexity of . We need to show that the first plus second terms of (13) are always negative. Comparing the first term with the last line of (14) and rearranging, since , to maintain feasibility  must be equal to or approach 0 and  must be equal to or approach 1, so at most an arbitrarily small fraction of certified firms are exactly graded.
(ii) We know from Proposition 1's proof that the expected loss from honors grading is less than from exact grading for any  such that either scheme is feasible, which is the case for  sufficiently small. For sufficiently small  it must be that expected loss from exact grading is less than from pass-fail grading because as  approaches zero, expected loss under exact grading approaches 0 while expected loss under pass fail grading is always bounded from below by either the pass pool or the fail pool's contribution to expected loss, which is
Therefore as  approaches 0 the optimal scheme is honors grading. Suppose as  goes to zero that in this scheme () − () does not go to zero. Then by the same argument as above the expected loss is bounded away from zero for the scheme, whereas the expected loss for the exact scheme goes to zero, so there is a contradiction with honors grading being optimal. ¥ 
